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I pass with relief 
from the tossing sea  
of Cause and Theory  
to the firm ground  
of Result and Fact. 
Winston S. Churchill 
The Story of the Malakand Field Force (1898) 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE MICRO-SYMPOSIUM ON 
ORIN KERR’S 
“A THEORY OF LAW” 
Ross E. Davies† 
OR MORE THAN A CENTURY, careful readers of the Green Bag 
have known that “[t]here is nothing sacred in a theory of 
law . . . which has outlived its usefulness or which was rad-
ically wrong from the beginning. . . . The question is What 
is the law and what is the true public policy?”1 Professor Orin Kerr 
bravely, creatively, and eloquently answered that question in his 
article, “A Theory of Law,” in the Autumn 2012 issue of the Green 
Bag.2 Uniquely among all theories of law that I know of, Kerr’s  
answer to the fundamental question of law and true public policy 
enables all scholars to answer that same question in their own ways. 
Not surprisingly, Kerr’s fine work has been well-received by 
thoughtful observers, none of whom appear to think it has outlived 
its usefulness or that it is fundamentally wrong.3 
                                                                                                 
† Ross Davies is a professor of law at George Mason University and editor of the Green Bag. 
1 Andrew Alexander Bruce, The Wilson Act and the Constitution, 21 GREEN BAG 211, 
220 (1909) (capitalization in the original). 
2 Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012). 
3 See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, Readings: Orin Kerr on “A Theory of Law,” LAWFARE, 
www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/readings-orin-kerr-on-a-theory-of-law/ (Nov. 25, 
2012); Dan Filler, Green Bag Call For Micro-Papers, THE FACULTY LOUNGE, 
www.thefacultylounge.org/2012/11/green-bag-call-for-micro-papers-.html (Nov. 
28, 2012). 
F 
Micro-Symposium: Orin Kerr’s “A Theory of Law” 
216 16 GREEN BAG 2D 
The Green Bag has a history of successful publication of Kerr’s 
work.4 And so we are especially pleased to be featuring his “A Theory 
of Law” in our first micro-symposium. Our call for papers (repro-
duced on the next page) attracted scores of thought-provoking micro-
essays: 101 of them, to be exact. Blessed with an abundance of good 
work but cursed by a shortage of space, we were compelled to select 
a small set – representative and excellent – of those essays to publish 
here. Fortunately, the most recent issue of our sibling publication, 
the Journal of Law, could spare a few pages for the presentation of 
more (but still not all) of the worthy submissions – specifically, pa-
pers by Laura I Appleman, Shawn Bayern and Jeffrey Kahn, Adam  
D. Chandler, Robert D. Cheren, Miriam A. Cherry and Anders 
Walker, Paul Gowder, Robert A. James, Jacob T. Levy, Orly Lobel, 
Theodore P. “Jack” Metzler, Ronak Patel, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, 
Alexandra J. Roberts, and Kent Scheidegger.5 We regret that we 
cannot do full justice to the outpouring of first-rate legal-theoretical 
commentary we received.  
Before getting to the micro-symposium itself, an editorial note is 
called for regarding the overlong commentary by Geoffrey Manne.6 
Our call for papers specified a 164-word maximum. Manne’s paper 
is 232 words long. Nevertheless, it appears here. Our only excuse is 
that we are following in the footsteps of the Harvard Law Review, 
which explains its stance on excessive article length on its website: 
The Review strongly prefers articles under 25,000 words in 
length . . . including text and footnotes. The Review will not 
publish articles exceeding 30,000 words . . . except in extraor-
dinary circumstances.7 
Our length limit is much lower, but our rationale is the same: the 
excellence of Manne’s commentary is extraordinary.8 Enjoy. 
                                                                                                 
4 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, How to Read a Legal Opinion, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 51 (2007); 
Frontispiece, 15 GREEN BAG 2D i (2012) (quoting Kerr). 
5 See 2 J.L.: PERIODICAL LABORATORY OF LEG. SCHOLARSHIP 487 et seq. (2012). 
6 See Geoffrey A. Manne, A Signaling Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 221 (2013). 
7 Submissions, www.harvardlawreview.org/submissions.php. 
8 This is not precedent for violating the Green Bag’s ban on articles of more than 
5,000 words. Cf. Sorchini v. City of Covina, 250 F.3d 706, 709 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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CALL FOR PAPERS 
he Green Bag invites submissions for its first micro-symposium, 
to be published in our Winter 2013 issue. 
Theme: Professor Orin S. Kerr’s new work: A Theory of Law, 16 
GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012). Invited topics: Any commentary on A 
Theory of Law that is novel, interesting, and not mean-spirited. Hu-
mor optional. Professor Kerr will, of course, be given a chance to 
have the last word. Whether he will take that chance remains to be 
seen. Length limit: No longer than the original A Theory of Law, which 
is 164 words long, including title, byline, and footnotes. (It is re-
produced in its entirety below.) Deadline: Finished works must be 
received at editors@greenbag.org by December 25, 2012. No ex-
tensions will be granted and no post-deadline tinkering will be per-
mitted. Selection criteria: Works will be selected for publication by 
the Green Bag and Professor Kerr based on their novelty, interest-
ingness, and good-spiritedness. 
A THEORY OF LAW 
Orin S. Kerr† 
t is a common practice among law review editors to demand that 
authors support every claim with a citation. These demands can 
cause major headaches for legal scholars. Some claims are so obvious 
or obscure that they have not been made before. Other claims are 
made up or false, making them more difficult to support using ref-
erences to the existing literature.  
Legal scholars need a source they can cite when confronted with 
these challenges. It should be something with an impressive but ge-
neric title. I offer this page, with the following conclusion: If you 
have been directed to this page by a citation elsewhere, it is plainly 
true that the author’s claim is correct. For further support, consult 
the extensive scholarship on the point.1 
                                                                                                 
† Orin Kerr is the Fred C. Stevenson Research Professor at the George Washington University 
Law School. 
1 See generally Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012). 
T 
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
AGAINST 
“A THEORY OF LAW” 
Kieran Healy† 
RIN S. KERR MAKES A VALUABLE contribution to the 
legal literature.1 However, its undeniable utility is 
limited by the routine need for authors to suggest 
that, while the work they are citing is of real value, 
scholarly opinion is nevertheless divided on the matter. The judi-
cious assessment of imaginary positions in notional debates is a core 
function of credible, legitimating footnotes. Thus, the present arti-
cle is made available to those who need to show Kerr’s approach is 
incomplete, and perhaps even misguided. It seems likely that further 
research is required, together with grant funding, and perhaps a 
conference at a congenial location. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                 
† Associate Professor in Sociology and the Kenan Institute for Ethics, Duke Univer-
sity. 
1 Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012). But see Kieran 
Healy, Against “A Theory of Law”, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 218 (2013). 
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
AN APPROACH TO LEGAL 
THEORY AND ACADEMIA 
Caitlin M. Hartsell† 
FTEN, LAW REVIEW EDITORS STRUGGLE with poorly 
cited manuscripts. As Orin Kerr noted in his now-
canonical article, A Theory of Law, some statements are 
either “so obvious” or “false” that they elude citation.1 
While Kerr offers a solution for true propositions, he offers no re-
course for propositions that the author totally fabricated.  
Thus, I offer this for the benefit of those beleaguered and exas-
perated editors faced with an uncited proposition and an unhelpful 
author. If an author insists on keeping a statement that is clearly er-
roneous or unsupported by the literature, cite here. If this citation 
makes it to publication, understand it contains this caveat emptor: 
this law review does not warrant the accuracy of the cited state-
ment, and the author did not care enough to check the editor’s sug-
gested source. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                 
† Caitlin Hartsell is an Articles Editor on the Washington University Law Review. 
1 Orin Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012). 
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
TURTLES 
Chad M. Oldfather† 
RIN S. KERR’S MAGISTERIAL A Theory of Law1 stands as an 
important contribution to legal theory. Yet, as its very 
title suggests, it is incomplete. For we must never 
forget that it is Kerr’s theory that we are expounding. 
This title-generated ambiguity leaves the article with two flaws. 
First, it undermines the article’s ability to support empirical claims. 
Scholars need a source for those, too. Second, it suggests that while 
impressive-but-generic titles are nice,2 enigmatic, one-word titles 
are better.3 
This article seeks to fill the resulting gaps. Thus: any and all em-
pirical claims that seemed reasonable enough to an author for that 
author to have included them in an article are clearly accurate.4 Al-
so: it really is turtles all the way down. I checked. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                 
† Chad Oldfather is a Professor of Law at the Marquette University Law School. 
1 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012). 
2 Id. 
3 E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (2009). 
4 See Kerr, supra note 1, at 111. 
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
A SIGNALING 
THEORY OF LAW 
Geoffrey A. Manne† 
N HIS SEMINAL – NAY, CANONICAL – article, A Theory of Law, 
Orin Kerr writes that 
[s]ome claims are so obvious or obscure that they have not 
been made before. Other claims are made up or false, 
making them more difficult to support using references to 
the existing literature.1 
Distinguishing between obvious/obscure and false citations is 
impossible under conditions of uncertainty.2 Meticulous law review 
editors seeking to distinguish between them must infer type from 
market or other signals.3 But because authors of both false and 
merely obscure claims may cite at equal cost to Professor Kerr’s 
article, doing so is merely “cheap talk,” and there is no separating 
equilibrium.4 
To rectify this, “I offer this page, with the following conclusion: 
If you have been directed to this page by a citation elsewhere, it is 
                                                                                                 
† Geoffrey Manne is a Lecturer in Law at the Lewis & Clark Law School. 
1 Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
I 
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plainly true that the author’s claim is true,”5 and, by citing to this 
article, if it is not true the author agrees to pay me $5,000.6 
Checks may be mailed to: 
Geoffrey Manne 
Lewis & Clark Law School 
10015 SW Terwilliger Blvd. 
Portland, OR 97219 
 
 
 
                                                                                                 
5 Id. 
6 Geoffrey A. Manne, A Signaling Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 221 (2013). 
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
A THEORY OF LAW’S 
INCOMPLETENESS 
Ryan C. Williams† 
ROFESSOR ORIN KERR’S MAGISTERIAL ARTICLE, A Theory of 
Law, promises an important breakthrough in legal scholar-
ship by providing authors with a single all-purpose citation 
for any claim that is sufficiently obvious or obscure (or 
made up or false) as to be otherwise unciteable.1 
Unfortunately, Professor Kerr’s argument is incomplete in that 
he fails to explain why authors should also cite my own work. I 
therefore offer this more thoroughly sourced – and hence, more 
persuasive – rejoinder, which corrects this glaring oversight and 
which should hereafter be cited alongside any future citation to 
Kerr’s A Theory of Law.2 
 
 
 
                                                                                                 
† Ryan Williams is a Sharswood Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
1 See Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012) (“If you have been 
directed to this page by a citation elsewhere, it is plainly true that the author’s 
claim is correct.”). 
2 Id.; see also Ryan C. Williams, A Theory of Law’s Incompleteness, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 
223 (2013). 
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
THEORY V. PRACTICE 
Arthur Stock† 
ERR’S ARTICLE PROVIDES YET ANOTHER instance of the 
failure of the legal academy to produce scholarship use-
ful to practicing lawyers. Law review editors are not 
unique in demanding citations for propositions that may 
be obvious, obscure, or false. Similar demands may emanate from 
clients and co-counsel who review drafts, and opposing counsel and 
judges who read filed briefs.  
However, citation to “A Theory of Law” will not satisfy the de-
mands of client, co-counsel, opposing counsel or the judiciary, all of 
whom agree that titles cited in briefs must consist of two words or 
phrases separated by “v.” and must be published in the Westlaw 
and/or Lexis databases.1 This micro-symposium contribution ex-
tends Kerr’s work to meet the practicing lawyers’ needs. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                 
† Arthur Stock is a practicing lawyer. 
1 See, e.g., Theory v. Practice, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 224 (2013), 2013 Westlaw ___ at 
*1. 
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
THESIS SENTENCE 
Jeffrey M. Lipshaw† 
RIN KERR’S CONTRIBUTION1 to the literature of over-
citation is commendable, but unfortunately lacking in 
one critical area.2 Law review editors regularly re-
quest a citation for the thesis sentence of the para-
graph, usually requiring the author to place a comment note on the 
draft to the effect: “This is the thesis sentence for the paragraph. It’s 
my contribution to the literature. It doesn’t need a footnote.” A 
citation to Professor Kerr’s otherwise perspicacious essay will not 
solve the problem. 
This essay’s unique contribution to the micro-symposium is to 
provide a solution to this specific conundrum.3 A citation to this 
essay demonstrates conclusively that the sentence so demarked is 
not otherwise dependent on citation, but is the product of the au-
thor’s original thought.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                 
† Jeffrey Lipshaw is an Associate Professor at the Suffolk Law School. He has nobody to thank. 
1 Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012). 
2 Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Thesis Sentence, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 225 (2013). 
3 Id. 
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
AN ANALOGIC 
THEORY OF LAW 
Lee Anne Fennell† 
ROFESSOR KERR’S ARTICLE IS ELEGANT and ambitious. It is 
also demonstrably false: the sun revolves around the 
moon.1 Kerr aims too high because he misunderstands the 
problem. Law review editors do not “demand that authors 
support every claim with a citation.”2 Rather, they merely demand 
that authors append a citation to every claim. The artfully dodgy cf. 
will serve as well as any see.  
To paraphrase words attributed to Tolstoy, all stories boil down 
to two: 
1. Someone goes on a journey. 
2. A stranger comes to town. 
So it is with law. If you were directed here by a citation elsewhere, 
you will find an analogy to the claim the author was making.  
 
 
                                                                                                 
† Lee Anne Fennell is Max Pam Professor of Law and Herbert & Marjorie Fried Research 
Scholar at the University of Chicago Law School. Copyright 2013 by Lee Anne Fennell. 
1 See Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012). 
2 Id. (emphasis added). 
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The day of the controversialist is happily coming to an end, 
and of the writer who twists the facts of science to suit a world 
of his own making, or of that of a group with which he is asso-
ciated. Theory can now be labelled theory, and fact, fact. 
Winston Churchill 
An Essay on the American Contribution  
and The Democratic Idea (1918) 
_________________ 
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INTRODUCTION TO 
PART 2 
OF THE MICRO-SYMPOSIUM ON 
ORIN KERR’S 
“A THEORY OF LAW” 
he Winter 2013 issue of the Green Bag includes that journal’s 
first micro-symposium, the subject of which is Professor 
Orin Kerr’s article, “A Theory of Law.”1 Unfortunately, the 
Green Bag is a small magazine. It lacks the space to publish more than 
a small (but representative) fraction of the excellent papers it re-
ceived in response to the call for papers for the micro-symposium. 
The Journal of Law has a bit (but only a bit) more flexibility when 
it comes to page counts and word counts. And so the next few pages 
of this issue are filled with several more excellent comments on “A 
Theory of Law” (although still nowhere near all the comments that 
deserve to be in print). 
For more information about the micro-symposium, please read 
the “Micro-Symposium” section that begins on page 213 of the Win-
ter 2013 Green Bag. 
 
 
                                                                                                 
1 Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012).  
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
A THEORY OF LAW, 
AMENDED & MENDED 
Laura I Appleman† 
 ood theories of punishment and crime 
 Rely on views mortal and divine. 
 This schema of Kerr’s 
Dramatically errs 
By forgetting to cite all of mine.1 
 
 
                                                                                                 
† Associate Professor, Willamette University College of Law. Copyright Laura I Appleman 
2012. 
1 See, e.g., Laura I Appleman, The Great Writ, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 93 (2005); The Appellate 
Lawyer’s Lament, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 210 (2005). 
G
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
THE UNEASY CASE FOR A 
THEORY OF LAW 
Shawn Bayern & Jeffrey Kahn† 
t is often said, though we don’t know precisely where, that 
there is very little new legal scholarship. This applies even to 
Professor Kerr’s apparently novel enterprise.1 
Still, two pieces do not make a crowded field. We are somewhat 
concerned that Kerr may overstate his case by referring to “exten-
sive scholarship on the point.”2 
Accordingly, recognizing the dialectic nature of scholarship, it 
seems only fair that where Kerr’s article is cited, this article be cited 
as contrary authority. This article is quite contrary indeed; some of 
it is false, and it disagrees even with itself.3 
 
 
                                                                                                 
† Assistant Professor and Larson Professor, Florida State University College of Law. Copy-
right © 2012 Shawn Bayern and Jeffrey Kahn. 
1 See Patrick M. McFadden, Fundamental Principles of American Law, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1749 
(1997). 
2 Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012).  
3 But see Shawn Bayern & Jeffrey Kahn, The Uneasy Case for a Theory of Law, 2 J.L.: PERIODI-
CAL LABORATORY OF LEG. SCHOLARSHIP 490 (2012).  
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
SUPPORTING THE 
INSUPPORTABLE 
AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
Adam D. Chandler† 
rofessor Kerr’s theory of law, both elegant and audacious, is 
not written on a blank slate. An earlier citation-fraud scheme 
debuted in April 1934, when the Harvard Law Revue ran a 
back-page ad headlined “Have You Ever Had To Support an Insup-
portable Proposition?” For “a small sum,” the editors would “arrange 
for the filing in the Harvard Law School library of an ‘unpublished 
thesis’ supporting your proposition.” Dubious papers on federal ju-
risdiction were their specialty, as they are for most law students. 
The price for attaching Professor Frankfurter’s name? Available up-
on request. 
And that’s precisely how Professor Kerr’s theory breaks new 
ground. It, too, carries the imprimatur of an esteemed scholar – in 
published form, no less – but it does so at no cost to those who 
would cite it. Professor Kerr is not in this for the money (only the 
citations). 
 
 
                                                                                                 
† Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice. 
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
AN ALTERNATIVE CITATION 
POLICY 
Robert D. Cheren† 
rofessor Kerr lamented the “common practice among law 
review editors to demand that authors support every claim 
with a citation.”1 But the editors of the Case Western Reserve 
Law Review had already reformulated the journal’s policies to better 
identify when a citation is required. Rather than demanding authors 
“support every claim,” we require a citation for every reference.2 A 
reference is an assertion of the contents of a document or a statistic. 
The citation guides the reader to the document or the statistic. Au-
thors may make whatever claims they desire with however so much 
support as they choose. The rule is simple to administer and – bet-
ter yet – omitted citations to references can be produced by 2Ls 
without taxing authors.3 
 
 
                                                                                                 
† Publisher, Volume 63, Case Western Reserve Law Review. 
1 Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012). 
2 Id. 
3 This and every sentence except for the text accompanying notes 1 and 2 have no refer-
ences and therefore require no citations. 
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
THE INFINITE CITATION 
Miriam A. Cherry & Anders Walker† 
s rain turns to sun 
Supra1 transforms to infra2 
Editors approve 
 
 
                                                                                                 
† Professors of law, Saint Louis University School of Law. 
1 See note 2, infra. 
2 See note 1, supra. 
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
THE SERIOUS POINT 
Paul Gowder† 
n other disciplines, editors don’t demand a footnote for every 
single factual assertion.  
Articles in peer-reviewed journals still have citations because 
their authors want to be believed, and being believed means sub-
stantiating controversial claims. Authors and their intended readers, 
being experts, know which claims are controversial.  
Law reviews are (theoretically) written for a non-specialist audi-
ence. But not every article is written for judges and lawyers: when I 
write a jurisprudence article, only handful of professors in law and 
philosophy might care. They can tell if I just make things up.  
Moreover, there is no authority in philosophy, social science, and 
other non-law disciplines: nobody’s words can be cited to defini-
tively establish a claim as true. By contrast, doctrinal areas have au-
thority in that sense (statutes, supreme court rulings, etc.). 
Law review editors should demand citations for every claim in 
doctrinal articles. They should let the author decide in theory arti-
cles.  
 
 
                                                                                                 
† Associate Professor, University of Iowa College of Law. Copyright © 2012 Paul Gowder. 
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
A CONTRARY VIEW 
Robert A. James† 
rofessor Kerr’s A Theory of Law might be criticized as filling a 
much-needed gap. But the “obsession of the legal community 
with documenting even the most obvious fact”1 amply justi-
fies a highfalutin title that can backstop a proposition for which no 
more specific citation has been found. 
Sometimes the converse is true. Authors are frequently com-
pelled to cite a famous and indispensable authority that they vaguely 
believe is wrong or obnoxious. The busy or lazy writer may wish to 
cast pale doubt on the authority without bothering to develop the 
full-blown scholarly apparatus of critique. This article is offered to 
that end, full in expectation that its citations will forever follow the 
signal But see. 
 
 
                                                                                                 
† Partner, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP. 
1 Davison M. Douglas, Attenuated Subtleties Revisited, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 375, 375 (1998). But 
see Robert A. James, A Contrary View, 2 J.L.: PERIODICAL LABORATORY OF LEG. SCHOLAR-
SHIP 495 (2012). 
P 
  2 JOURNAL OF LAW 496 
A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
A NON-IDEAL 
THEORY OF LAW 
Jacob T. Levy† 
he Folk Theorem shows that essentially any outcome of a 
repeated game can be shown to be an equilibrium. The the-
orem of the second-best shows that, if one variable in an 
optimization is held at the non-optimal level, the overall optimum is 
not necessarily approached as the other variable approaches its op-
timal level. It follows that essentially anything, no matter how coun-
terintuitive, can be justified as a “second-best” outcome. 
Orin Kerr’s important article supports claims such that, as he 
puts it, “it is plainly true that the author’s claim is correct.”1 Some 
claims are too counterintuitive for “plainly true” to suffice. If you 
have been directed to this page by a citation elsewhere, it is surpris-
ingly true that the author’s conclusion is correct as a matter of the 
best-attainable second-best. 
 
 
                                                                                                 
† Tomlinson Professor of Political Theory, McGill University. 
1 Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012). 
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
THE COGNITIVE-CITATION 
APP™ 
Orly Lobel† 
err’s innovative proposal to establish a one-stop citation for 
all references is groundbreaking but incomplete. Kerr 
overlooks a little-known yet invaluable goal of law review 
citations: the detection of unsupported theories. To this end, I offer 
a far more advanced mechanism than the Kerr One-Cite System. 
Bringing legal citation to the 21st century and applying the latest in 
neuro-tech,1 the Cognitive-Citation App™ (CCA) will allow legal 
scholars to place a mobile device near the frontal lobe and to there-
by digitally confirm (CCA code automatically generates) that the 
scholar has direct knowledge that the claims made in their article are 
supported. Claims may be obvious, obscure, or false, but they can-
not be unsupported. 
The app will also include the Headache Function™ allowing le-
gal scholars to provide law review editors support for “major head-
aches” which Kerr, unsupportedly, claims to occur when demands 
for citations are made.  
 
 
                                                                                                 
† University Professor and Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
1 See CCA-OL-1. 
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
PRACTICAL LEGAL THEORY 
Theodore P. “Jack” Metzler 
n his ground-breaking article, “A Theory of Law,” Professor 
Kerr demonstrates that law review editors often require support 
in the form of a citation for every claim made in an article.1 
Kerr’s contribution in this regard cannot be overstated,2 but it is 
also true that repeated citations to a single work of legal scholarship, 
no matter how important, might make an author’s own work ap-
pear to be needlessly derivative.3 Moreover, some claims may ap-
pear weaker when supported by a single source.4 Accordingly, like 
Kerr, “I offer this page, with the following conclusion: If you have 
been directed to this page by a citation elsewhere, it is plainly true 
that the author’s claim is correct. For further support, consult the 
extensive scholarship on the point.”5 
 
 
                                                                                                 
1 Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id.; Theodore P. “Jack” Metzler, Practical Legal Theory, 2 J.L.: PERIODICAL LABORATORY 
OF LEG. SCHOLARSHIP 498 (2012). 
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
ENDING THE WAR 
WHY EDITORS CANNOT QUESTION CITATIONS TO 
“A THEORY OF LAW” 
Ronak Patel 
eflecting a war as old as legal scholarship, A Theory of Law 
assumes that unnecessary citation demands derive from edi-
tors.1 But it is tradition that requires this rule; personally, 
we editors loathe it.2 Thus, we support Kerr, but need an article 
justifying its use from our perspective. 
But a professor cannot write it, as editors may not trust them on 
this topic. Instead, a current editor loyal to our community should 
author it.3 Scholars can use it to bolster a Kerr citation, and defuse 
editors’ concerns.4 
Let’s end this war. 
 
 
                                                                                                 
1 Orin Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012); see also Ronak Patel, Ending The 
War: Why Editors Cannot Question Citations to “A Theory of Law”, 2 J.L.: PERIODICAL LABORA-
TORY OF LEG. SCHOLARSHIP 499 (2012) (validating Kerr’s assertions). 
2 Id. 
3 Patel is the McGeorge Law Review’s Chief Articles Editor. 
4 For an example, see Patel, supra note 1, at n.1. 
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
A PLAUSIBLE BUT NOT 
DECISIVE OBJECTION 
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski† 
 Theory of Law is an invaluable – one might say preemptive – 
contribution that will play a crucial role in a wide array of 
scholarly inquiry. Prof. Kerr’s project nevertheless neglects 
an important gap in the legal literature, namely the citational com-
pletist’s impulse to denote disagreement with a proffered proposi-
tion, even though discussion of said dissent will be limited to paren-
thetical summation.  
The ideal candidate for this “but see” citation is an article by a 
scholar who is (a) not so formidable in stature so as to cast doubt on 
the citing author’s claim, while (b) not being an obviously fringe 
figure. A junior professor at a respectable institution fits such a bill;1 
he is even likely to value the marginal appreciation in his citation 
count.2 
 
 
                                                                                                 
† Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. Copyright © 2012 Jeffrey Pojan-
owski. 
1 See, e.g., author note, supra. 
2 See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, A Plausible But Not Decisive Objection, 2 J.L.: PERIODICAL LABOR-
ATORY OF LEG. SCHOLARSHIP 500 (2012). 
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
ON NARCISSISM 
Alexandra J. Roberts† 
ith his recent opus, “A Theory of Law,” Orin Kerr en-
deavors to provide a comprehensive reference for legal 
scholars. Yet his celebration of self-citation forges a 
dangerous precedent. While every important thinker cites his own 
work, his friends’ work, and the work of those whose friendship he 
feigns, Kerr’s see generally sets legal scholarship afloat on a flume of 
solipsism.1 Given the exacting demands of law review editors, such 
self-citation will soon flank every period and semicolon. From 
there, a citational maelstrom comprising intra-sentential,2 
fix3ational, and p4ost-allophonic self-citation will ensue, drowning 
the professoriate in a sea of ids. 
 
 
                                                                                                 
† Visiting Assistant Professor at Boston University School of Law. 
1 See DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, CONSIDER THE LOBSTER AND OTHER ESSAYS (2006) 87 n.32 
(defining “cannabic solipsism,” the adolescent, marijuana-induced “terror that [one’s] own 
inner experience is both private and unverifiable”). 
2 See generally Alexandra J. Roberts, On Narcissism, 2 J.L.: PERIODICAL LABORATORY OF LEG. 
SCHOLARSHIP 501 (2012). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
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A COMMENT ON ORIN KERR’S “A THEORY OF LAW” 
CURSING RECURSION 
Kent Scheidegger† 
ecursive subroutine calls are a powerful but dangerous 
technique in computer programming. Routines regularly 
call other routines to do various tasks, but a routine can 
also call itself. If the programmer is not careful, such a recursive call 
can result in an infinite loop, with the routine calling itself without 
limit and locking up the computer. Infinite recursion is generally 
followed by cursing – by the user at the programmer. 
After 50 years, more or less, the legal profession has caught up. 
Professor Orin Kerr has introduced the recursive law review cita-
tion.1 This is a powerful but dangerous technique.2 Damn him. 
 
 
                                                                                                 
† Legal Director, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation. Copyright © 2012 Kent Scheidegger. 
1 See Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012). 
2 Cf. Kent Scheidegger, Cursing Recursion, 2 J.L.: PERIODICAL LABORATORY OF LEG. SCHOL-
ARSHIP 502 (2012). 
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